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I.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION
A. Issues
The Iraqi Special Tribunal (“Tribunal” or “IST”), has jurisdiction to hear cases which are

grave in nature, namely genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, that took place in
Iraq between 1968 and 2003. 1 In the summer of 1992, over 60 merchants were tried and
executed in Iraq for violating anti-trust laws. This memorandum examines whether any of the
acts by the former regime which occurred during these trials and executions constitute crimes
that may be tried by the IST.
B. Summary of Conclusions
1. Members of the Former Regime Cannot Be Tried by the Iraqi Special
Tribunal Under Article 11 of the IST Statute, Because No Genocide Has
Occurred.
Article 11 of the IST Statute grants jurisdiction to the Tribunal over genocide. 2 Genocide
is defined by the Statute as killing, harming, or moving a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group with the intent to destroy the group. 3 There are three requisite elements for genocide: (1)
one or more prohibited acts, (2) against members of a protected group, (3) committed with the
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the group. The first element is satisfied in the case at hand
because ‘killing’ is one of the prohibited acts listed in the Statute. However, it is unlikely that
genocide occurred in this case because the second two elements of genocide are not satisfied.
First, merchants are not a protected group. The intent of the Article 11, and the Genocide

1

See Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/human_rights/Statute.htm
[hereinafter IST Statute] [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14]

2

Id. at art. 11.

3

Id.

1

Convention 4 which it was based upon, was clearly to protect only national, ethnical, racial, or
religious groups. Professional groups such as merchants do not fall into any of these categories.
Second, even if merchants can be called a protected group, there is no evidence to support an
assertion the killings of the merchants were intended to destroy merchants as a group (or any
other group that the merchants belonged to). Thus, no one involved in the executions should be
tried for genocide.
7. Members of the Former Regime Can Be Tried by the Iraqi Special Tribunal
Under Article 12 of the IST Statute for Crimes Against Humanity.
Article 12 of the IST Statute grants the Tribunal jurisdiction to hear crimes against
humanity. 5 Crimes against humanity are widespread or systematic attacks on a civilian
population (where an ‘attack’ is defined in Article 12 by various deplorable acts). In order for a
person to have committed crimes against humanity: (1) there must be an attack; (2) the acts of
the perpetrator must be part of the attack; (3) the attack must be directed against any civilian
population; (4) the attack must be widespread or systematic; and (5) the perpetrator must know
that his/her acts constitute part of a pattern of widespread or systematic crimes. 6 Applying these
factors to the case at hand, several of people involved in the executions can be charged with
crimes against humanity.
The first element, that an attack must have occurred, is easily satisfied because ‘killing’ is
the first enumerated act which constitutes an ‘attack’ under Article 12. 7 The second element,

4

See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78
U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention] [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1]

5

See IST Statute, supra note 1, art. 12. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14]

6

See Mohamed Elewa Badar, From the Nuremburg Statute to the Rome Statute: Defining the Elements of Crimes
Against Humanity, 5 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 73(2004).[hereinafter Badar] [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tab 50]
7

See IST Statute, supra note 1, art. 12(a)(1). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14]

2

that the acts of the perpetrator be part of the attack, is satisfied by most of those involved in the
execution. Anyone who killed merchants, or ordered or aided the killings, will have committed
acts that are part of the attacks. The third element, that the attack be directed against a civilian
population, is easily satisfied, as the merchants clearly fall within the historic definitions of
civilians. The fourth element, the required scale of the attack, can also be satisfied by showing
that the over 60 merchants were executed as a plan to deflect criticism from the regime, which
itself, was part of a larger plan to use ‘special’ courts to eliminate people the former regime did
not find desirable. The numerosity of victims may indicate that the attacks were widespread;
while the existence of a preconceived plan, the fact that the executions occurred on more than
one occasion, and the existence of complex extra-judicial courts (used mainly to levy death
penalties) may show that the killings were systematic. Finally, the last factor to be assessed in
determining whether a crime against humanity occurred is the perpetrator’s mens rea. The
requisite mens rea for the perpetrator of a crime against humanity is an intent to commit the
underlying offense and knowledge that the offence is part of a larger policy or crime. 8 Thus, all
persons who contributed to the killing of the merchants with the knowledge of a larger plan to
execute merchants can be charged with crimes against humanity under Articles 12 and 15 9 of the
IST Statute.

8

See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2003). [hereinafter Cassese] [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 38]

9

See IST Statute, supra note 1, art. 15. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14] Article 15 sets forth
individual criminal responsibility.

3

8. Members of the Former Regime Can Be Tried by the Iraqi Special Tribunal
Under Article 13 of the IST Statute for War Crimes, if there Is Proof that the
Executions Were in Relation to an Armed Conflict.
Those responsible for the execution of the merchants may be tried by the Tribunal under
Article 13 for war crimes. 10 Article 13 grants the IST jurisdiction over numerous inhumane acts
committed during an armed conflict. The first two steps in establishing the existence of war
crimes are factual inquiries. Namely, was there an armed conflict going on at the time of the
executions and is there an obvious link between the executions and the armed conflict. Once the
nexus to an armed conflict is established, the next step is to determine whether any of the
prohibited acts of Article 13 have been committed. In the case at hand one particular act has
clearly been committed: “The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all judicial guarantees
which are generally recognized as indispensable;” 11 Lastly, the mental element required for the
commission of the war crimes is simply the requisite mens rea for the underlying offenses.
Thus, all persons who contributed to the sentencing and executions of the merchants may be tried
for war crimes under Articles 13 and 15, as long as a link between the crimes and an armed
conflict can be established. It is unlikely, however, that any armed conflicts were ongoing in
July of 1992 because the Gulf War had ended and most rebellions had been suppressed.
4. Members of the Former Regime Can Be Tried by the Iraqi Special Tribunal
Under Article 14(a) of the IST Statute, Which Prohibits Outside Manipulation of
the Judiciary.
Because there is evidence that senior members of the regime threatened a judge during a
judicial proceedings in order to improperly influence a trial, those members can be tried by the

10

See id. at art. 13.

11

Id. at art. 13(c)(4).

4

IST under Article 14 of the IST Statute. 12 Article 14(a) grants the Tribunal the power to try
“those outside the judiciary [who attempted] to manipulate the judiciary or involvement in the
functions of the judiciary, in violation, inter alia, of the Iraqi interim constitution of 1970, as
amended” 13 There is evidence that a senior member of the regime had threatened to kill a
Special Court for the Ministry of Interior (“SCMI”) judge with a handgun during an antitrust
violation trial. 14 Thus, those persons who made the threats and any persons who contributed to
the threatening of the judge can be tried by the IST under Articles 14 and 15. This conclusion is
supported by precedent from the Judges’ Trial, 15 the Ministries Trial, 16 and the High Command
Trial 17 of the Subsequent Nuremberg Trials.
5. Article 15 of the IST Statute Extends Criminal Liability to Anyone Who
Attempts or Contributes to the Crime.
Article 15 of the IST Statute defines who can be held responsible for a crime under IST
jurisdiction. 18 In addition to criminalizing the commission of any of the IST crimes, Article 15
makes it a crime to order, solicit, induce, aid, abet, contribute to, or attempt to commit the

12

See id. at art. 14.

13

Id. at art. 14(a).

14

Stated in an e-mail from Eric Blinderman to Michael Scharf on May 5th, 2005. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 57]

15

The United States of America vs. Josef Altstötter, et. al., 6 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 40, 5859 (United Nations War Crimes Commission, 1948) (U.S. Mil. Trib. 1947). [hereinafter Judges’ Trial][Reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21]
16

The United States of America vs. Ernst von Weizsäcker, et. al, 16 I.L.R. 344, XIV Nuernberg Trials 314 (U.S.
Milit. Trib. 1952). [hereinafter Ministries Trial] [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 22]

17

The United States of America vs. Wilhelm von Leeb, et. al., U.S. Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 30 December
1947-28 October 1948, Case No. 72, L.R.T.W.C., Vol. XII, at 72. [hereinafter High Command Trial] [Reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 19]
18

IST Statute, supra note 1, art. 15. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14]

5

crime. 19 Additionally, Article 15 removes head-of-state immunity and any other special
treatment, regarding criminal responsibility, for any person part of the Iraqi government. 20
Finally, the Statute adopts the doctrine of ‘superior responsibility,’ making superiors liable for
IST crimes by subordinates, 21 and reaffirms that ‘following orders’ is not a defense to the
commission of a crime under the IST Statute. 22
6. The Former Regime Committed Several Human Rights Violations and Violated
Several International Laws, During the Trials and Executions, Which Do Not
Fall Under IST Jurisdiction.
The summary executions by the former regime are in direct violation of nearly every
provision of Articles 6 and 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 23
(“ICCPR”). Article 6 of the ICCPR guarantees the right to life and provides guidance for the use
of the death penalty. 24 Specifically, Article 6 implies that the death penalty should be used
sparingly, as a last resort, and only after full judicial privileges are guaranteed. Article 14
ensures that everyone charged with a crime should have a fair trial. 25 The trials and executions
of the merchants are obvious violations of these fundamental rights. However, the IST does not
have jurisdiction over human rights violations not listed in its statute. Therefore, even though
the violation of the Articles 6 and 14 are grave in nature, they cannot be tried by the IST.
19

See id.

20

Id. at art. 15(c).

21

Id. at art. 15(d).

22

Id. at art. 15(e).

23

See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 UNTS 171,art. 6, 14. [hereinafter
ICCPR] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 7] Iraq signed the ICCPR on February 18, 1969 and
ratified it on January 25, 1971. See Ratification status of ICCPR, Office of the High Commission on Human Rights,
available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/4.htm [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 70]
24

ICCPR, supra note 23, at art. 6 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 7].

25

Id. at art. 14.

6

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 26
The Special Court of the Ministry of Interior (“SCMI”) was a court which sat outside
Iraq's general criminal court system and had jurisdiction to hear cases involving Iraqi Merchants.
It was part of a system of extra-judicial courts that were answerable directly to Saddam Hussein
and the Revolutionary Command Council, which was the highest executive organ in Iraq. Cases
were referred to the courts by senior members of Hussein’s regime. Trials before these courts
generally lasted no longer than a couple of hours and the defendants had no right of appeal. The
defendants and defense council rarely knew what the defendants were being charged with until
after the trial had started. Further, the courts were empowered to levy (and usually did levy) the
death sentence – usually carried out within hours of imposition. Tens of thousands have
reportedly been executed by these Special Courts.
By 1992, after the imposition of UN sanctions on Iraq, prices for basic foodstuffs and
goods began to rise dramatically. To deflect criticism from the regime, Saddam Hussein
allegedly issued orders to round up various merchants, in July of 1992, from Baghdad and send
them to the SCMI on charges of violating Iraq's antitrust laws – a crime which (under the Iraqi
penal code) is punishable by death.
As a result of this order from Saddam Hussein, approximately 44 merchants from
Baghdad were arrested over the course of several hours and brought before the SCMI. All were
tried and executed by morning. Although a defense attorney was present at their trials, he was
not permitted to gather or introduce evidence nor was he even told the charges against his clients.
In addition, there is evidence that a senior member of the former regime threatened the presiding
judge of the SCMI with his hand gun, telling him that he would kill the judge if the case was not
26

The factual background is derived from an e-mail by Eric Blinderman sent to Pratheep Sevanthinathan on July
14th, 2005. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 58]
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settled. Approximately three months after the first round of executions, another19 merchants
were rounded up and executed under similar circumstances.
For the purposes of this memo, it will be assumed that the anti-trust charges were false or
unproven and that the trials were conducted unfairly and prejudicially against the merchants.
Therefore, the executions of the merchants shall be treated as extrajudicial and summary
executions.
III. EXRTRAJUDICIAL AND SUMMARY EXECUTIONS
A summary execution is a type of extrajudicial punishment in which a person suspected
of subversive or other criminal activity is killed, often at the time and place of their being
discovered, and hence usually without any meaningful inquiry or investigation. 27 Summary
executions typically occur in a theatre of war, 28 but are not limited to such circumstances. The
term ‘summary execution’ is often used interchangeably with ‘extrajudicial execution.’ The
difference between the terms is that ‘summary execution’ simply connotes a quick, on-the-spot,
killing after detainment, while ‘extrajudicial execution’ tends to mean killing after detainment
without a just trial. 29 As stated by Human Rights Watch, “[e]xtrajudicial executions occur when
a public authority arbitrarily and deliberately takes the life of a human being in circumstances
other than those related to the legitimate use of force in situations such as may occur in an armed

27

See Wikipedia, Summary Execution, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Summary_execution (last modified 30 May
2005) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 76]
28

Id.

29

See Wikipedia, Extrajudicial Punishment, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Extrajudicial_punishment (last
modified 30 Mar 2005) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 74] ‘Extrajudicial execution’ is also used to
denote State-sponsored assassinations of targets which are a threat to the State’s peace. See also Amnesty
International’s collection of articles related to ‘extrajudicial killings’ at
http://www.amnesty.org.uk/deliver/keyword/109.html
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confrontation or in carrying out the death penalty.” 30 Practically, most summary executions are
extrajudicial, and vice versa.
Summary and extrajudicial executions are both clearly prohibited in international law as a
violation of the right to life, 31 under customary international law and the International Covenant
of Civil and Political Rights. 32 This prohibition is most evident in UN General Assembly
resolution 2393 (XXIII) of 26 November 1968. 33 In that resolution, the General Assembly urged
Governments to ensure that in countries where the death penalty could be imposed, persons
accused of capital crimes were given the benefit of the most careful legal procedures and the
greatest possible safeguards. 34 Further, in 1980 the Sixth United Nations Congress on the
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders condemned "the practice of killing and
executing political opponents or suspected offenders carried out by armed forces, law
enforcement or other governmental agencies or by paramilitary or political groups" acting with
the support, tacit or otherwise, of official forces or agencies. 35
The actions of the former regime in Iraq, concerning the execution of the Baghdad
merchants, were classic instances of extrajudicial and summary executions. Hence, the
30

See Joel Solomon, Human Rights Watch, Mexico’s International Human Rights Obligations, available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/mexico/Mexi991-04.htm [hereinafter HRW] [Reproduced in part in accompanying
notebook at Tab 66]

31

Id.

32

See ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 6; [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 7] Which reiterates that
"every human being has the inherent right to life." Id. The provision continues by stating that "this right shall be
protected by law" and that "no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life". Id.

33

G. A. Res. 2393, U.N. GAOR, 23rd Sess., U.N. Doc. 2393 (XXIII) (1968). [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 2]

34

Id. See also Fact Sheet No.11 (Rev.1), Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs11.htm. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 60]
35

See Sixth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Caracas, 25
August-5 September 1980: report prepared by the Secretariat (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.IV.4),
chap. I, sect. B, resolution 5. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 72]
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executions were clear breaches of international law, most notably, the ICCPR. However, it does
not necessarily follow that these breaches of international law may be tried by the Iraqi Special
Tribunal. The IST does not have jurisdiction over all violations of international law. It may only
hear crimes stipulated by its constitutive statute. As a result, only if the executions amounted to
genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity will the IST have jurisdiction.
IV. THE DIFFERENCE AMONG THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN THE IST
The Iraqi Special Tribunal has jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, and
war crimes. These three crimes are known as the most heinous of all international crimes. The
definitions and distinctness of these crimes has been evolving as newer tribunals encounter them.
The IST Statute has defined the three crimes in a very broad manner in comparison to previous
international and internationalized tribunals. 36 As a result, the IST Statute definitions contain
substantial overlap amongst genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. However, for
purposes of serving indictments, the limits of each crime must be set out, and their differences
must be delineated. Because the IST Statute has broadened the definitions of crimes against
humanity and war crimes, using precedent from former tribunals and commentary on the
international crimes can help to locate the focus of each IST crime.
In general, genocide is the crime of targeting and destroying or attempting to destroy a
group of people based on race, nationality, religion, or ethnicity. Crimes against humanity are
systematic or widespread attacks on a group of people. War crimes are attacks on people not
taking part in hostilities by those who are taking part in the hostilities. Genocide and crimes

36

The broadness of the definitions is probably a product of the criticisms from the ICTY and ICTR judges and legal
scholars regarding some of the superfluous requirements contained in the ICTY and ICTR statutes. For instance,
many critics have argued that the distinction between internal and international war crimes serves no purpose.
Additionally, many have argued that ICTY Statute’s requirement of an armed conflict and the ICTR Statute’s
requirement of a discriminatory intent for crimes against humanity are overly limiting.
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against humanity are similar in that they protect groups of people against intentional attacks by
governments or militaries. They differ in that a mandatory prerequisite for crimes against
humanity are that the attacks always be either widespread or systematic; while genocide has no
such requirement. What genocide does require, differing from crimes against humanity, is the
existence of a protected group (racial, national, ethnic, or religious). 37 Thus, attacks on groups
of people are prohibited in international law, via crimes against humanity, if the attacks are
widespread or systematic; or, via genocide, if the group being attacked is a protected group.
War crimes share characteristics with both genocide and crimes against humanity, in that they
encompass similar acts. War crimes differ from genocide and crimes against humanity, in that
they can only occur in the presence of an armed conflict. Further, war crimes can occur on a
smaller scale than crimes against humanity 38 (no widespread or systematic requirement) and the
protected groups for war crimes are expanded to all people not involved in the armed conflict. 39
The executions of the Baghdad merchants do not neatly fall within any of these
categories, yet shares characteristics with all of the crimes. Depending on the circumstances
surrounding the executions, those involved may be charged with any and each of the discussed
crimes. The subsequent sections of this memo evaluate the facts of the case within the confines
of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, and assesses whether any such crimes
have been committed.
37

See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The International Criminal Court and the Political Economy of Antitreaty
Disclosure, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1597 (2003). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 47]
“The difference between genocide and crimes against humanity is the absence of a mens rea requirement involving
the destruction of a protected group…” Id. at 1604.
38

See id. “…the difference between war crimes and crimes against humanity is that the latter may occur during
peace or war, and could be perpetrated even against stateless victims or people of the perpetrator's own nationality.”
Id.

39

See Cara Levy Rodriguez, Slaying the Monster: Why the United States Should not Support the Rome Treaty, 14
AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 805, 862 (1999). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 44]
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V. DO THE EXECUTIONS CONSTITUTE A CRIME UNDER IST JURISDICTION?
The Iraqi Special Tribunal is a specialized court which has limited jurisdiction. It was
created to hear only the most heinous crimes committed by members of Iraq’s ruling party
between 1968 and 2003. Specifically, jurisdiction has been limited to cases involving (1)
genocide, 40 (2) crimes against humanity, 41 (3) war crimes, 42 and (4) certain abuses of power. 43
Any crimes occurring in Iraq which do not fall into one of these categories are relegated to Iraqi
federal courts. 44 Thus, if, and only if, any of the conduct surrounding the mass executions of the
Iraqi merchants falls into one of the aforementioned categories can the IST hear the case.
1. Article 11 - Genocide
Article 11 of the IST Statute grants the Tribunal jurisdiction to hear cases concerning
genocide. 45 Genocide is defined by the Statute as:
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
1. killing members of the group;

40

See IST Statute, supra note 1, art. 11 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14]

41

Id. at art. 12

42

Id. at art. 13

43

Id. at art. 14

44

See Law of Administration for the State of Iraq, available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html
[hereinafter TAL] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 8]. The Transitional Administrative Law (TAL)
was signed on March 8, 2004 by the Interim Governing Council (GC) of Iraq and will be the Supreme Law of Iraq
during the transitional period. The TAL sets out a path for the establishment of a representative and sovereign Iraqi
government that protects fundamental rights and provides a stable political structure. The first phase of the
transitional period began on 30 June 2004 when an Iraqi Interim Government was vested with full sovereignty, and
the Coalition Provisional Authority was dissolved. The Iraqi government will govern according to the TAL and an
annex issued before the beginning of the transitional period. The second phase begins when the Iraqi Transitional
Government takes office after the elections of the National Assembly. The TAL was aimed to expire once a new
permanent government is elected under a permanent constitution and takes office. See Iraqi Interim Government,
GlobalPolicy.org, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/ig.htm [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 65].
45

See IST Statute, supra note 1, art. 11 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14]
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2. causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
3. deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
4. imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and
5. forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 46

This definition of genocide is rooted in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, dated December 9, 1948 (“Genocide Convention”) 47 , which was ratified by
Iraq on January 20, 1959. 48

The Convention provides the IST with the jurisdictional basis to

hear the crime of genocide. 49 Thus, whether the IST has jurisdiction to prosecute a person for
genocide should be based on interpretations of the Genocide Convention. However, since there
is no Iraqi case law directly applying the convention 50 an examination of customary international
law and precedent from international tribunals is necessary.
Under the Genocide Convention, the crime of genocide has three elements. (1) One or
more prohibited acts, (2) against members of a protected group, (3) committed with the intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, the protected group. 51 The first two comprise the actus reus, or

46

Id.

47

See Genocide Convention, supra note 4. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1]

48

See IST Statute, supra note 1, art. 11(a). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14]

49

Id.

50

See David L. Nersessian, The Contours of Genocidal Intent: Troubling Jurisprudence from the International
Criminal Tribunals, 37 TEX. INT'L L.J. 231 (2002). [hereinafter Contours] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 45]
51

Id. at 256
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material component of the crime. 52 The latter element comprises genocide's mens rea, or
requisite mental state. 53 All three elements must be proved in order to establish the crime. 54
In the case at hand, the first element can easily be proved. “Killing members of the
group” 55 is the first prohibited act mentioned in both the Genocide Convention and Article 11 of
the IST Statute. Since there is evidence that approximately 63 merchants were targeted then
killed, the first element of genocide can be satisfied if the prosecution can show that the
merchants were unjustly killed (summary executions) instead of legally executed.
The final two elements are not as easy to prove. For one, it is not apparent from the
language of the IST Statute and the Genocide Convention if merchants may constitute a
‘protected group.’ The exclusion of professional groups as a protected group from both
documents suggests a desire to leave such groups unprotected by the Genocide Convention and
the Tribunal. Both the IST Statute and the Genocide Convention clearly state that the protected
groups are “national, ethnical, racial or religious group[s].” 56 Merchants, as a group, do not fall
into any of these categories. The Trial Chamber of International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(“ICTR”) was the first court to define protected group status:
On reading through the travaux preparatoires of the Genocide Convention
(Summary Records of the meetings of the Sixth Committee of the General
Assembly, 21 September - 10 December 1948, Official Records of the General
Assembly), it appears that the crime of genocide was allegedly perceived as
targeting only ‘stable’ groups, constituted in a permanent fashion and membership
52

See Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10, Judgment, para. 60 n.71, (ICTY Trial Chamber Dec. 14, 1999), at
http://www.un.org/icty/brcko/trialc1/judgement/index.htm [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24]
See also Contours, supra note 49, at 256. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 45]
53

Id. at 62. See also Contours, supra note 50, at 256. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 45]

54

Contours, supra note 50, at 256.

55

IST Statute, supra note 1, art. 11(a)(1) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14]; Genocide
Convention, supra note 4, art. 2(a). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1]
56

IST Statute, supra note 1, art. 11(a) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14]; Genocide Convention,
supra note 4, art. 2. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14]

14

of which is determined by birth, with the exclusion of the more ‘mobile’ groups
which one joins through individual voluntary commitment… 57
Thus, some attribute the exclusion of groups such as professional and political groups from the
Convention because they are groups which are joined voluntarily and the Convention only aims
to protect those groups that are determined by birth. 58 However, as pointed out by noted legal
scholar William Schabas, the very restrictive definition of protected group which appeared in the
Genocide Convention was not what was intended by the framers of the Convention: “The
debates leave little doubt that the decision to exclude political groups was mainly an attempt to
rally a minority of Member States, in order to facilitate rapid ratification of the Convention, and
not a principled decision based on some philosophical distinction between stable and more
ephemeral groups.” 59
In subsequent decisions, the ICTR adopted a purely subjective approach, noting that an
ethnic group could be "a group identified as such by others, including perpetrators of the
crimes." 60 As the Trial Chamber held in Rutaganda “[t]he concepts of national, ethnical, racial
and religious groups have been researched extensively and . . . at present, there are no generally
and internationally accepted precise definitions thereof. Each of these concepts must be assessed

57

See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (ICTR Trial Chamber Sept. 2, 1998) at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Akayesu/judgement/akay001.htm [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 23]
58

See William A. Schabas, Groups Protected By The Genocide Convention: Conflicting Interpretations From The
International Criminal Tribunal For Rwanda, 6 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 375 (2000). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 52]
59

Id. at 382. It was presumed that the Soviet Union would not sign the convention if political groups were
considered ‘protected.’ Id.

60

Prosecutor v. Kayeshema and Ruzindana,, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, para. 98 (ICTR Trial Chamber,
May 21, 1999), available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/KayRuz/judgement/index.htm
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 26]
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in the light of a particular political, social, and cultural context.” 61 Consequently, whether a
group is protected by the Convention should be determined on a case-by-case basis, dependant
upon the surrounding circumstances.
Therefore, even though it is unlikely that merchants are protected groups, there is still a
slim chance that they may be considered protected under the Genocide Convention because of
the universal ambiguity in the definitions of ethnic, racial, religious, and, specifically, national
groups. For example, in Akeysu, 62 the ICTR defined national groups as "a collection of people
who are perceived to share a common legal bond based on common citizenship, coupled with
reciprocity of rights and duties." 63 Under this definition the merchants may be considered a
national group if they were all Iraqi citizens. The counter-argument to this position is that the
drafters of the Genocide Convention intended for a collection of individuals organized on the
basis of a common characteristic to be insufficient to establish nationality without some
additional legal interest tying them together. 64 In other words, mere common citizenship and an
additional shared characteristic will not be sufficient to establish a protected national group. An
additional legal interest such as residence in another nation is needed for the group to qualify as
protected under the Genocide Convention (e.g. if all Syrian nationals living in Iraq were targeted,
they would be a protected national group).

61

Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T , Judgment and Sentence (ICTR Trial Chamber Dec. 6, 1999),
at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Rutaganda/judgement/index.htm [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 34]; See also Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. ICTY-98-33-T, Judgment (ICTY Trial Chamber Aug. 2, 2001), at
http://www.un.org/icty/krstic/TrialC1/judgement/index.htm [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 28]

62

63

Akayesu, supra note 57. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 23]
Id. at 512.

64

See, e.g., U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 75th mtg. at 113, 115, U.N.Doc. A/C.6/SR.75 (1948) (Mr. Lacks,
Pol.) (Mr. Petren, Swed.). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 16]
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Thus, since the merchants were targeted based on their profession and not on their
ethnicity, religion, race, or nationality, they are not likely protected under the Genocide
Convention or Article 11 or the IST Statute. As a result, the second element of genocide is not
satisfied.
Likewise, the third element of genocide, the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
protected group, is probably not satisfied. Several of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) cases have held that the requisite mens rea for genocide is a
purposeful intent to commit genocide. 65 Additionally, in Akayesu the ICTR Trial Chamber held
that the offender is only culpable "when he commits a [prohibited offence] with the clear intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group." 66 The "clear intent to destroy" language
strongly indicates a purpose to destroy the group is required as a mens rea; it is unlikely that
"clear intent" could reasonably be equated with mere knowledge that certain acts will destroy the
group. 67 Strengthening this position is the constitutive statute of the International Criminal
Court (“ICC”), which expressly states that a purposeful intent is required for the crime of
genocide. 68 Based on the stated facts, the intent of those responsible for the killings was not to
destroy merchants or certain merchants, but rather, to deflect criticism from Saddam Hussein’s
regime. Mere knowledge that killing a large number of merchants could destroy them, as a
group, in Iraq is not sufficient to satisfy the requisite mens rea for intent to commit genocide.

65

See Jelisic, supra note 52, (the defendant "could not be found guilty of genocide if he himself did not share the
goal of destroying in part or in whole a group even if he knew that he was contributing to or thought his acts might
be contributing to the partial or total destruction of a group.") [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 24]
Id. at 86. See also Kristic, supra note 57. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 28]

66

Akayesu, supra note 58, at 521. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 23]

67

See Contours, supra note 50. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 45]

68

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF,183/9, art. 30 at 87 (1998). [hereinafter
Rome Statute]. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 11]
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Therefore, in order to show that those responsible for the executions had a genocidal
intent the evidence collected must be able to create an inference that genocide was desired result
of the killings. For example, pertinent evidence would include: (1) a showing of the scale and
general nature of the atrocities committed; 69 (2) proof of the discriminatory targeting of the
members or property of one group to the exclusion of other groups; 70 (3) proof of methodical or
systematic planning or killing; 71 (4) the weapons employed and the extent of bodily injury; 72 (5)
documents reflecting participation in or knowledge of atrocities; 73 (6) derogatory language
toward the targeted population; 74 (7) the destruction of a group’s institutions; 75 and proof of
widespread and systematic violence. 76 Without any such evidence, no charges of genocide
should be filed against those responsible for the execution of the merchants.
In sum, it is unlikely that genocide was committed during the mass executions because
there was no apparent “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or

69

See Akayesu, supra note 58, at 523. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 23]

70

Kayishema, supra note 60, para. 123. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 26]

71

Id.

72

Id.

73

Id. at 527

74

See Jelisic, supra note 52, at 73 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 24]; see also Kayishema,
supra note 65, at 93. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 26]
75

See Prosecutor v. Karadzic and Mladic, Confirmation of Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61, Case Nos. ICTY-95-5R61 and ICTY-95-18-R61, para. 294 (ICTY Trial Chamber, July 16, 1996), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/karadzic&mladic/trialc/rev-ii960716-e.pdf [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
25]
76

See Jelisic, supra note 52, at 73. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14]
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religious group” as required by Article 11 of the IST Statute. 77 Both the requisite intent and
protected group status is lacking in the case at hand.
2. Article 12 – Crimes Against Humanity
Article 12 of the IST Statute grants the Tribunal jurisdiction to hear cases concerning
‘crimes against humanity.’ 78 In general, crimes against humanity are “particularly odious
offenses” 79 (such as murders, rapes, and torture) committed systematically or on a large scale. 80
While the specific acts which comprise crimes against humanity are fairly uniform, 81 the
circumstances under which the acts are carried out vary jurisdictionally. Specifically, the
statutes of the ICTY and ICTR, and the Rome Statute all state different conditions required for
the existence of crimes against humanity. For example, the ICTY requires the existence of an
armed conflict 82 and the ICTR requires the existence of discriminatory grounds 83 in order for
there to be a crime against humanity. 84 These two requirements, however, have become obsolete

77

See IST Statute, supra note 1, art. 11. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14]

78

See id. art. 12.

79

Cassese, supra note 8, at 64. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 38]

80

Id.

81

Simon Chesterman, An Altogether Different Order: Defining the Elements of Crimes Against Humanity, 10 DUKE
J. COMP. & INT'L L. 307 (2000). [hereinafter Duke] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 51]
82

The ICTY Statute mandates that the act be "committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in
character, and directed against any civilian population." Statute of the Int'l Criminal Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia,
U.N.S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), amended by U.N.S.C. Res.
1166, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3878th mtg., at art. 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1166 (1998) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 13]

83

The ICTR Statute defines a crime against humanity as an act "committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial, or religious grounds." Statute of the Int'l
Criminal Trib. for Rwanda, U.N.S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453th mtg., at art. 3, U.N Doc. S/RES/955
(1994). [hereinafter ICTR Statute] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 12]
84

However, in light of advice from legal scholars and international law experts, judges for both the ICTY and ICTR
ultimately overlooked the mentioned conditions. See Duke, supra note 81. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 51]
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as they no longer reflect customary international law. 85 Consequently, the newer Rome Statute
for the International Criminal Court employs a more encompassing definition of crimes against
humanity, which does not require armed conflicts or discriminatory grounds. 86 This broader
definition of crimes against humanity was also adopted by the IST. Accordingly, crimes against
humanity are defined under the IST Statute as;
any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: 87
1. Murder;
2. Extermination;
3. Enslavement;
4. Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
5. Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in
violation of fundamental norms of international law;
6. Torture;
7. Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, or any
other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
85

See Michael P. Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for Peace: Was There a Duty to Prosecute International Crimes in
Haiti?, 31 TEXAS INT’L L. J. 1, 29-31 (1996). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 49] “[A] cursory
survey of [the development of crimes against humanity] should remove any doubt that the concept of crimes against
humanity under customary international law now extends to atrocities committed during peacetime. First, the
linkage to war was not included in the definition of crimes against humanity contained in Control Council Law
No.10…Second, in its authoritative report on the development of the laws of war at the conclusion of the
Nuremberg trials and Control Council Law No. 10 trials, the U.N. War Crimes Commission concluded that
international law may now sanction individuals for crimes against humanity committed not only during war but also
during peacetime. Third, in the International Law Commission’s formulation of the Principles of International Law
Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, the Commission
indicated that crimes against humanity…could be committed apart from war…Fourth, the 1968 Convention on the
Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to Certain War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity provides in Article
I that such limitations do not apply to ‘[c]rimes against humanity whether committed in time of war or in time of
peace.’ Finally, the Secretary-General’s Report on the Statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal…stated that international
law now prohibits crimes against humanity ‘regardless of whether they are committed in an armed conflict.’” Id.
(citations omitted).
86

87

See Rome Statute, supra note 68, art. 7. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11]
Id.
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8. Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political,
racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender or other grounds
that are universally recognized as impermissible under international
law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal;
9. Enforced disappearance of persons; and
10. Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.

This codification of crimes against humanity in the IST Statute is largely based on the Rome
Statute and customary international law – most of which was developed by the ICTY and ICTR.
Thus, precedent from the ICTY and ICTR may be useful in interpreting Article 12.
Accordingly, in order to convict a person of a crime against humanity, precedent from the
ICTY and ICTR dictates that several elements must be present: (1) there must be an attack; (2)
the acts of the perpetrator must be part of the attack; (3) the attack must be directed against any
civilian population; (4) the attack must be widespread or systematic; (5) the perpetrator must
know that the acts constitute part of a pattern of widespread or systematic crimes directed against
a civilian population and know that the acts fit into such a pattern.88 Each of these elements
must be satisfied in order for the perpetrators of the executions to be convicted of crimes against
humanity.
I. Was there an attack?
Unlike in the ICTY and ICTR statutes, the term ‘attack’ is defined within the IST Statute
itself. Article 12(b)(1) of the IST Statute defines "[a]ttack directed against any civilian
population" as “a course of conduct involving the multiple commission[s] of acts referred to in
88

See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, at para. 85 (ICTY Appeals Chamber June 12,
2002), available at http://www.un.org/icty/kunarac/appeal/judgement/index.htm [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 29] See also Badar, supra note 6. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 50]
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the above paragraph against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a state or
organizational policy to commit such attack.” In the case at hand, an argument can certainly be
made that multiple murders took place during the executions. Since the executions were
conducted without any actual legal basis, 89 they are probably unjustified killings, i.e., murders.
Murder is the first prohibited act listed in Article 12, which constitutes an ‘attack.’ 90 Therefore,
the first element of a crime against humanity, the existence of attack, is likely satisfied.
However, it should be noted that if the executions were indeed legal and justified punishments,
then no attack within the meaning of ICTY will have occurred.
II. Were acts of the perpetrators part of the attack?
The second element for crimes against humanity, that the acts of the perpetrators were
part of the attack, is satisfied with a showing that an accused defendant’s actions or omissions 91
caused or aided the killing of the merchants. The acts of executing the merchants and the
planning of the executions will clearly satisfy this element. Thus, the acts of the ‘executioners’
and their superiors were ‘part of the attack.’ Additionally, the intimidation of the judge by senior
officials may also be considered ‘part of the attack’ for purposes of prosecution. 92 Finally, the
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sentencing by the judge is probably also part of the attack based on precedent from Judges’ Trial
at Nuremberg. 93 In the Judges’ Trial several German judges were tried and sentenced by the
Nuremberg Military Tribunal III for war crimes and crimes against humanity stemming from
their participation in the genocide of the millions of Jews during the Holocaust through their
capacity as justices of the peace. 94 In fact, at least one judge was convicted for war crimes and
crimes against humanity despite publicly speaking out against the Nazi party and vehemently
denying that he supported their plans or policies. 95
III. Was the attack directed against any civilian population?
The third element, which requires that the attack be direct against a civilian population, is
also clearly satisfied in the case at hand. The requirement is intended to exclude attacks on
armies as crimes against humanity. This allows courts to levy stiffer penalties to those who
indiscriminately attack civilians during conflicts. In turn, civilians can garner additional
protection during wars through deterrence; and warfare can be confined to militaries.
Assuming that the merchants were non-combatants, they are precisely the type of
“civilian population” the IST Statute intends to protect. This is true even if every merchant was
an Iraqi citizen. The IST Statute unambiguously states that crimes against humanity can be
committed against “any civilian population,” 96 indicating that a State’s attack on its own citizens
is covered by Article 12. This contention is supported by the ICTY holding in Tadic, which, in
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discussing the same provision from its own statute states "the inclusion of the word 'any' makes it
clear that crimes against humanity can be committed against civilians of the same nationality as
the perpetrator…” 97 Thus, even though the merchants and the perpetrators were all Iraqi, the
killings were still an attack on a civilian population susceptible to crimes against humanity and
covered by Article 12 of the IST Statute.
IV. Were the executions widespread or systematic?
The primary aspect differentiating a normal crime, falling under local court jurisdiction,
and crimes against humanity, which fall under IST jurisdiction, is the widespread and systematic
nature of the crimes. "Widespread" refers to the number of victims, whereas "systematic" refers
to the existence of a policy or plan. 98 The purpose of these requirements is to exclude isolated
and random acts from the category of crimes against humanity. 99 It is to be noted that "the
requirement that the attack be 'widespread' or 'systematic' comes in the alternative;" 100 meaning
that the two requirements are interchangeable and should be examined separately.
a)

Widespread

Defining the scope of a widespread or systematic attack has been a challenge for prior
tribunals. There has not yet been an exact definition settled on for ‘widespread’ attacks,
although the consensus among most experts is that it implies a large number of victims. In
Akayesu, ICTR Trial Chamber I cited the International Law Commission's (ILC) commentary to
its 1996 Draft Code of Crimes to the effect that "widespread" may be defined as "massive,
frequent, large scale action, carried out collectively with considerable seriousness and directed
97

Tadic, supra note 90, at para. 634. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 35]
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against a multiplicity of victims." 101 Similarly, Trial Chamber II in Kayishema understood
‘widespread’ to mean an attack "directed against a multiplicity of victims." 102 Thus, most believe
that a large number of victims is required for an attack to be widespread. However, it should be
noted that in the Vukovar Hospital Decision 103 the ICTY held that “an individual committing a
crime against a single victim or a limited number of victims might be recognized as guilty of a
crime against humanity if his acts were part of” 104 a larger plan or policy. Also, the execution by
Soviet authorities of Hungarian leader Imre Nagy in 1956 was also called a crime against
humanity even though there was only one victim. 105 The key inquiry is whether the killings are
part of a larger-scale attack, i.e., if there are only a few victims, are these victims only a small
portion of the overall number of victims. Chart 1, attached at the end of this memo, shows the
number of victims various courts have deemed sufficient to find that crimes against humanity
have occurred. 106
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In the case at hand, the killing of the merchants can certainly be viewed as a widespread
attack on the civilian population of Baghdad. There were numerous victims (63 merchants killed
amongst thousands of others executed by extrajudicial courts) and the killings were part of a
larger-scale attack (there were two sets of executions of merchants and several other similar
executions by other extrajudicial courts). The primary counter-argument to this contention is
that each execution was an isolated and legal punishment, not committed as part of a large-scale
massacre. However, if the special extra-judicial courts of Hussein’s regime were truly show
courts which were a cloak for the execution of dissenters, then the argument that the merchant
executions were isolated incidents does not hold true.
b)

Systematic

Like the term ‘widespread,’ ‘systematic’ is not susceptible to a precise definition. 107 In
general, ‘systematic’ attacks have come to denote repeated attacks as part of a preconceived plan.
The ICTR, again citing the ILC, explained ‘systematic’ as "thoroughly organized and following a
regular pattern on the basis of a common policy involving substantial public or private
resources." 108 Likewise, in Kayishema, a systematic attack was said to be one "carried out
pursuant to a preconceived policy or plan." 109 Thus, in determining whether an attack was
‘systematic’ the key inquiry is whether there was a policy or plan associated with the attacks. In
the present case, the facts of the case do indicate that there was a preconceived plan in place.
The plan was a policy choice made by the former regime to try and convict merchants for anti-
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trust violations, in order to deflect criticism from the regime. This plan, ultimately, included the
murder of many merchants. Even further, a larger parent plan apparently existed to use
extrajudicial courts as conduit for carrying out mass executions. Thus, the requirement of a
systematic attack is undoubtedly satisfied.
In sum, the requirements for a widespread or systematic attack are alternative
requirements, with each possibly satisfied by the massacre of the merchants. The sheer number
of victims will likely prove that the attack was widespread; while existence of preconceived
plans and the fact that executions occurred on more than one occasion show that the killings
were systematic.
V. Did the perpetrator know the acts constituted part of a pattern of widespread or
systematic crimes directed against a civilian population?
The final element of crimes against humanity is the mens rea, requiring the perpetrator to
have knowledge that his/her acts are part of larger-scale crimes against humanity. The Iraqi
Special Tribunal includes a provision in Article 12 which requires “knowledge of the attack.” 110
Of the other three current international tribunal statutes, only the ICC’s statute includes a similar
express men rea provision. 111 The inclusion of the requirement of “knowledge of the attack”
was probably included in the Rome Statute and the IST Statute as a result of the confusion
produced by the exclusion of such a provision in the ICTY and ICTR statutes. Unfortunately, in
trying to clarify the mental state required for crimes against humanity, the IST Statute’s mens rea
provision has added an additional ambiguity to the equation.
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From a plain reading of the Statute, “knowledge of the attack” could mean either the
perpetrator of a crime against humanity must have knowledge that his/her conduct (1) is a crime
itself or (2) is a prohibited act which is part of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian
population (i.e., a nexus between the act and a crime against humanity). The latter definition is
probably the intended meaning.
Under Article 12, “attack” is defined as “a course of conduct involving the multiple
commissions of acts referred to in the above paragraph against any civilian population, pursuant
to or in furtherance of a state or organizational policy to commit such attack.” 112 The terming of
an “attack” as a “course of conduct” while also referencing an “organizational policy” indicates
that the “attack” is the ends to a criminal plan, which may or may not be comprised of smaller
crimes. In the case at hand, the “multiple commissions” of “murder” is the ultimate goal and,
therefore, the “attack.” Any acts which comprise the multiple commissions (killing one or two
people, detaining, planning, ordering, etc.) may not be an “attack” themselves but still are
punishable as crimes against humanity because they are part of the attack. When viewed in this
light, the “knowledge of the attack” as mentioned in Article 12, must mean knowledge of the
existence of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population. Such a reading of the
statute makes sense in light of the fact that there are two criminal aspects to crimes against
humanity; the individual criminal act and the larger inhumane policy or plan. The mens rea
conveyed in the statute only addresses the larger policy/plan aspect of the crime, while remaining
silent, as it should, on the individual criminal mens rea (because the requisite mental state for the
underlying crime will differ from act to act). Thus, the perpetrator of crimes against humanity
under the IST Statute, must have (1) the requisite mens rea for the underlying offense and (2)
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knowledge that his/her acts make up a smaller part of a larger “attack” on a civilian population.
This interpretation is supported by Professor Cassese, former president of the ICTY:
The requisite subjective element or mens rea in crimes against humanity is not
simply limited to the criminal intent (or recklessness) required for the underlying
offence (murder, extermination, deportation, rape torture, persecution, etc.). The
viciousness of these crimes goes far beyond the underlying offence, however
wicked or despicable it may be. This additional element – which helps to
distinguish between crimes against humanity from war crimes – consists of
awareness of the broader context into which this crime fits, that is knowledge that
the offences are part of a systematic policy or of widespread and large-scale
abuses. 113
Further, holdings from both the ICTY and the ICTR provide support for Professor Cassese’s
interpretation. For example, the ICTY Trial Chamber in Tadic, held that "the perpetrator must
know of the broader context in which his act occurs." 114 The ICTR came to a similar conclusion,
but viewed the knowledge requirement as having two parts (which are seemingly redundant).
The Trial Chamber in Kayishema held that the mens rea contained two parts; (1) knowledge of
the attack and its widespread or systematic character and (2) awareness of the fact that the
criminal activity constitutes part of the attack. 115 Additionally, in R. v. Finta, 116 the Canadian
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Supreme Court held that the accused must be aware of or willfully blind to facts or
circumstances that would bring his or her acts within the scope of a crime against humanity. 117
Applying this precedent to the case at hand means that those who executed the merchants
must have (1) purposefully intended to kill the merchants and (2) had knowledge that the
executions were part of a systematic policy or of widespread abuses. Likewise, the persons who
ordered or aided the executions must have (1) intended to order or aid the executions and (2) had
knowledge that the executions were part of a systematic policy or of widespread abuses.
3. Article 13 – War Crimes
Article 13 of the IST Statute grants the Tribunal jurisdiction over war crimes. In general,
war crimes are crimes against people not involved in an armed conflict by those who are. War
crimes are defined under the IST Statute as (1) “[g]rave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949,” 118 (2) “[o]ther serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in
international armed conflict” named in the statute, 119 (3) attacks on people not taking part in the
hostilities during an armed conflict, 120 and (4) “[s]erious violations of the laws and customs of
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war applicable in armed conflict not of an international character.” 121 The common element
amongst these crimes, and the base requirement for war crimes, is that the prohibited act must
have occurred during an ‘armed conflict.’ Thus, the initial inquiry in determining if a war crime
has taken place must focus on whether or not the prohibited act took place during an armed
conflict.
I. Was an ‘armed conflict’ in progress during the executions?
‘Armed conflict’ has not been expressly defined by the IST Statute or the Geneva
Conventions. Proving the existence of an armed conflict has never really been an issue among
most war crime tribunals. For the most part, the existence of an armed conflict has been obvious
in war crimes trials. However, when the existence of an armed conflict has not been obvious, it
has been left to the States involved to determine whether an armed conflict exists. 122 If there is
disagreement as to the armed conflict status of hostilities, the most applicable criteria is the
intensity of violence. 123 In general, whether or not there are two sides fighting in a mutual battle,
if the intensity of violence is very high, the hostilities will inevitably be considered an armed
conflict. 124 Thus, even acts of terrorism or other small attacks can amount to an ‘armed
conflict.’ 125
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Although not expressly mentioned the Conventions themselves, the Additional Protocols
to the Geneva Conventions 126 does provide guidance on how to determine the existence of an
armed conflict. Article 51(2) of Protocol I (applicable to international armed conflicts)
provides: “The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians shall not be the object
of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the
civilian population are prohibited.” 127 Likewise, Article 4(d) of Additional Protocol II
(applicable to internal armed conflicts) provides: “the following acts against the persons referred
to in paragraph 1 are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever…” 128
Finally, Article 13 of Additional Protocol II states that: “The Civilian population as such, as well
as individual civilians shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary
purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.” 129 Thus, the
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions have inferred that armed conflicts entail
violence against civilians on a scale large enough to spread terror.

which the actor is associated is such tat the act or attempted act is tantamount to an attack by an armed force.”
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The ambiguity in the term ‘armed conflict’ is not accidental. The issue of what a “case of
armed conflict” actually constituted arose continuously at the Diplomatic Conference that
resulted in the composition of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 130 Delegates at the Convention
chose not to define ‘armed conflict’ because they did want to limit its scope; deliberately leaving
it open for multiple interpretations. Thus, an armed conflict can be any hostilities ranging from
an all out war to a simple rebellion. 131 For example, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights held that the killing of under 42 civilians by the Argentine military during peacetime was
an armed conflict. 132 Similarly, a U.S. court held that the hijacking of an airplane during
peacetime was sufficient to satisfy the armed conflict threshold. 133

Still, many have attempted

to define the limits and bounds of an ‘armed conflict.’ Jean S. Pictet, in his commentary to the
Geneva Conventions, has opined that an armed conflict is relating to “armed forces on either side
engaged in hostilities – conflicts, in short, which are in many respects similar to an international
war, but take place within the confines of a single country” 134 Additionally, in one of the few
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working definitions of ‘armed conflict’ by a court, the ICTR defined the term as “the existence
of open hostilities between armed forces, which are organized to a greater or lesser degree.” 135
In the case at hand, facts are insufficient to make a determination regarding armed
conflict status. At a minimum, there must be open hostilities between two (or more) groups of
people. The war between Iraq and the United States and the several rebellions against Saddam
Hussein’s regime during the 1990s are examples of hostilities which will qualify as armed
conflicts for the present case. 136
II. Is there a nexus between the armed conflicts and the executions?
Once it is concluded that an armed conflict exists, the next step in establishing that war
crimes have occurred is to determine whether there is a nexus between the armed conflict and the
prohibited acts. This requirement is customary international law aimed at excluding crimes
which are not related to the armed conflict. For example, the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg (“IMT”) held that the crimes committed against the Jews of Germany prior to World
War II could not be prosecuted by the IMT because they were not related “in execution of, or in
connection with…” the war. 137 The IMT, however, did allow the same crimes (persecution,
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repression, and murdering of Jews) which occurred after the war commenced to be prosecuted,
as the crimes were then sufficiently related to an armed conflict. 138 More recently, As the ICTY
first held in Tadic, prosecution for war crimes requires that the “offence [was] closely related to
the armed conflict as a whole." 139 Similarly, the ICTY held later in Pavo and Zenga, 140 "[t]here
must be an obvious link between the criminal act and the armed conflict." 141 Thus, the mere fact
that a prohibited act took place at the same time that an armed conflict was ongoing does not
automatically make the act a war crime. This point was emphasized by the Trial Chamber of the
ICTR when it held that:
When the country is in a state of armed conflict, crimes committed in this period
of time could be considered as having been committed in the context of armed
conflict. However, it does not mean that all such crimes have a direct link with the
armed conflict and all the victims of these crimes are victims of armed conflict. 142
Thus, even if the execution of merchants had occurred during the Persian Gulf War or
during uprising against Hussein, if there is no link between the executions and those hostilities
then no war crimes exist. There must be some indication that the plan to execute the merchants
was part of an armed conflict. In the case at hand, the most suitable nexus would be between the
executions and a rebellion based on criticism of the former regime; although there does not seem
to be any facts indicating that such a rebellion ever occurred.

138

Id.

139

Tadic, supra note 90, at para. 573. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 35]

140

Prosecutor v. Pavo and Zenga, Case No. ICTY-96-21, Judgment (ICTY Trial Chamber Nov. 16, 1998).
http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/trialc2/judgement/index.htm. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 33]

141

Id. at 193

142

See Kayishema, supra note 60, at 600. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 26]
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III. Internal or International Armed Conflict?
The next step in determining whether war crimes have been committed, is determining
whether the armed conflict was an international or internal conflict. Although the IST Statute
has made strides to abolish the distinction, it still contains a few acts which are exclusive to
international or internal conflicts. International conflicts are those between two or more States,
or between a State and a national liberation movement, pursuant to Article 1(4) of the First
Additional Protocol of 1977 of the Geneva Conventions. 143 Internal conflicts are large-scale
armed hospitalities, other than internal disturbances and tensions, or riots isolated or sporadic
acts of armed violence, between State authorities and rebels, or between two or more organized
armed groups within a State. 144 In the IST Statute, Article 13, sections (a) and (b) apply to
international conflicts, 145 while section (d) applies to internal conflicts. 146 Section (c) of Article
13 applies to both internal and international conflicts. 147 Since each of these sections criminalize
different acts, whether or not the executions amount to, or are comprised of, war crimes may
depend on whether the executions were linked to an internal or international conflict. 148

143

Cassese, supra note 8, at 54. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 38]

144

Id.

145

See IST Statute, supra note 1, art. 13(a) and (b). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14]

146

Id. at 13(d).

147

Id. at 13(c).

148

However, it should be noted that the more current view is that in modern warfare it no longer makes sense to
distinguish between international and international conflicts. Cassese, supra note 8, at 62. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 38] This point was stressed by the Appeals Chamber in Tadic (Interlocutory Appeal)
when it opined: “Why protect civilians from belligerent violence, or ban rape, torture or the wanton destruction of
hospitals, churches, museums or private property, as well as proscribe weapons causing unnecessary suffering when
two sovereign State are engaged in war, and yet refrain from enacting the same bans or providing the same
protection when armed violence has erupted ‘only’ within the territory of a sovereign State?” Tadic, supra note 90,
at para. 97. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 35]The distinction between international and
internal conflicts has been severely watered-down by the IST Statute.
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The prohibited acts which are exclusive to international war crimes, as listed in sections
13(a) and (b), and which apply to the case at hand (i.e., to the trials and executions) are: “Willful
killings;” 149 “Willfully denying the right of a fair trial to a prisoner of war or other protected
person;” 150 “Unlawful confinement,” 151 and collective punishment. 152 The last is probably the
most fitting charge which could be brought against members of the former regime, if the
executions were related solely to an international armed conflict. If the former regime argues
that the executions did not amount to willful killings but rather were justified judicial executions,
they can still be charged with collective punishment because it is highly unlikely that all 63
merchants violated anti-trust laws.
Prohibited acts which are exclusive to internal war crimes are listed in section 13(d).
However, none of the prohibited acts which are exclusive to internal conflicts apply to the case at
hand. Finally, certain acts are prohibited in both international and internal conflicts. The
execution of the merchants concern several of these acts, including: “Intentionally directing
attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part

149

IST Statute, supra note 1, art. 13(a)(1). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14] It has been
opined that, “extrajudicial executions amount to "willful killings" under article 147 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention and, by extension, are war crimes at international law.” See Ardi Imseis, In the Fourth Geneva
Convention and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 65, 109 (2003). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 43]
150

IST Statute, supra note 1, art. 13(a)(5). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14] Where protected
persons include “civilians on the territory of the Detaining Power or subject to the belligerent occupation of an
Occupying Power” Cassese, supra note 8, at 55. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 38]
151

IST Statute, supra note 1, art. 13(a)(7). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14]

152

Collective punishment is the act of punishing a large group of people because of the actions of certain members
of a group that they all belong. It is not one of the listed acts in the Article 13 of the IST Statute, but rather comes
from Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which states “[n]o protected person may be punished for an
offence he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of
terrorism are prohibited.” Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Art. 33,
12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
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in hostilities;” 153 “Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel
treatment and torture;” 154 “Taking of hostages;” 155 and “The passing of sentences and the
carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted
court, affording all judicial guarantees which are generally recognized as indispensable;” 156
The last listed act is the most fitting charge for the trials and executions of the merchants. The
“carrying out of executions” without “affording all judicial guarantees which are generally
recognized as indispensable” is exactly the crime which was carried out. Thus, if there was an
armed conflict during the executions and the executions were linked to the conflict then the acts
of those responsible for ordering, aiding, contributing, and carrying out the executions fall neatly
into IST jurisdiction under Articles 13(c)(4) and 15 of the IST Statute. This means that even the
judges who were coerced into sentencing the merchants may be tried for war crimes pursuant to
precedent from the Judges’ Trial at Nuremberg 157 (although they should have the affirmative
defense of coercion at their disposal).
IV. Mens rea
Finally, unlike for crimes against humanity, the IST Statute does not require knowledge
of the circumstances for war crimes. Thus the mental element required for war crimes are
simply the requisite mens reas for the underlying acts.

153

IST Statute, supra note 1, at art. 13(b)(1) and 13(d)(1). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14]

154

Id. at art. 13(c)(1).

155

Id. at art. 13(c)(3).

156

Id. at art. 13(c)(4).

157

See Judges’ Trial, supra note 15. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21]
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4. Article 14 – Violations of Stipulated Iraqi Laws (Abuse of Power)
Unlike the ICTY, the ICTR, and the ICC, the Iraqi Tribunal includes violations of certain
national laws in its jurisdiction. Article 14 of the IST Statute grants the Tribunal jurisdiction
over “violations of stipulated Iraqi laws.” 158 Specifically, section (a) of Article 14 states that
“[t]he Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute…[f]or those outside the judiciary, the attempt
to manipulate the judiciary or involvement in the functions of the judiciary, in violation, inter
alia, of the Iraqi interim constitution of 1970, as amended.” 159 From a literal interpretation of
the Article, several of the persons involved in the mass executions can be charged for attempting
to manipulate the judiciary. Certainly the person who threatened the presiding judge with a
handgun can be charged under Article 14. The threat on the judge’s life in order to coerce him
into sentencing the merchants was a clear attempt to manipulate the judiciary. Additionally,
anyone else who may have threatened, compensated, or otherwise attempted to improperly
influence the judiciary, even if unrelated to the execution of the merchants, may be tried by the
IST under Article 14. 160 Finally, because no other international tribunal includes abuse of power
in their jurisdiction, and because the crime is based on Iraqi law, precedent for the interpretation
of Article 14 (if needed) should be obtained from Iraqi court decisions.

158

IST Statute, supra note 1, art. 14. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14]

159

Id. at art. 14(a).

160

It should be noted that the Judges’ Trial case from the Nuremberg trials does not apply as precedent for Article
14 of the IST Statute. The Judges’ Trial defendants were all judges, lawyers, or other participants in the judiciary
system of Germany. Article 14 of the IST expressly covers only those who are “outside the judiciary.” IST Statute,
supra note 1, art. 14(1). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14] Thus, Aricle 14 of the IST Statute
aims at criminalizing the improper influencing of judicial proceedings from outside of the judiciary, whereas the
Judges’ Trial case focuses on the improper conduct of those within the judiciary itself. The High Command Trial
and the Ministries Trial, on the other hand, can be used as precedent applying to the senior (non-judicial) members
of the regime violating Article 14.
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5. Who can be charged?
Article 1 of the IST Statute states that “[t]he Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over any
Iraqi national or resident of Iraq accused of the crimes listed in Articles 11 to 14 …committed
since July 17, 1968 and up until and including May 1, 2003, in the territory of the Republic of
Iraq or elsewhere…” 161 Article 15 goes further and defines who, based on their actions, can be
held responsible for a crime under IST jurisdiction. 162 Since the crimes under the IST are grave
in nature and tend to involve a large number of people, the Statute expressly lists all persons who
may be liable for a particular crime. In addition to criminalizing the commission 163 of any of the
IST crimes, Article 15 makes it a crime to order, solicit, induce, 164 aid, abet, 165 contribute to, 166
or attempt to commit the crime. 167 Additionally, the Article 15 removes head-of-state immunity
and any other special treatment, regarding criminal responsibility, for any person part of the Iraqi
government. 168 Finally, Article 15 adopts the doctrine of ‘superior responsibility’ 169 and

161

IST Statute, supra note 1, art. 1(2). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14]

162

See id. at art. 15(a). “A person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of this Tribunal shall be individually
responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with this Statute.” Id.

163

Id.

164

See IST Statute, supra note 1, art. 15(b)(2). Section (b)(5) also makes inciting others to commit genocide a crime.
Id. at art. 15(b)(5). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14]

165

Id. at art. 15(b)(3).

166

Id. at art. 15(b)(4).

167

Id. at art. 15(b)(6).

168

Id. at art. 15(c).

169

Id. at art. 15(d). The ‘doctrine of superior responsibility’ is a modern version of command responsibility,
developed by the ICTY and ICTR. It represents the concept that that superiors, whether or not recognized officially,
are responsible for the criminal actions of their subordinates if they had recklessly allowed the subordinate to
commit a crime. For a simple summary on superior responsibility see CBC News, Command, superior and
ministerial responsibility, available at
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/iraq/abughraib_commandresponsibility.html [hereinafter CBC] [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 54]

40

removes ‘just following orders’ 170 as a defense. The inclusion of these provisions make passing
off liability to from superiors to subordinates and vice versa useless to defendants. Under the
IST Statute, everyone is responsible for results they could have controlled. Thus, everyone
involved in the executions ranging from the officers to the senior members of the regime to the
judges at the trial may be charged if their participation in the executions if their participation is
are encompassed by both Article 15 and any of the substantive crimes listed in Articles 11-14.
VI. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
In addition to classifying the executions of the merchants as war crimes and crimes
against humanity, the executions are also probably breaches of fundamental human rights, and
further, a violation of several international conventions, including the ICCPR. Article 6(2) of the
ICCPR, expressly states that:
In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be
imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at
the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the
present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final
judgment rendered by a competent court. 171

Because the ICCPR allows the death penalty “only for the most serious crimes” the executions of
the merchants probably violate Article 6(2). Article 7 of the UN Human Rights Committee
General Comment on ICCPR Article 6 states: “The Committee is of the opinion that the
expression ‘the most serious crimes’ must be read restrictively to mean that the death penalty
should be a quite exceptional measure.” 172 The UN Human Rights Committee has also specified
170

IST Statute, note 1, art. 15(e). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14] For a simple summary on
the ‘following orders defense’ see CBC, supra note 169. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 54]

171

ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 6(2). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 7]

172

Amnesty International, People’s Republic of China Executed "according to law"? - The death penalty in China
(citing Article 7 of the UN Human Rights Committee General Comment on ICCPR Article 6), available at
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that "…it is contrary to the Covenant to impose the death penalty for crimes which are of an
economic nature." 173 In addition to the triviality, and economic nature, of the crime the
executions were based on, the executions may also violate section 4 of Article 6. Section 4 states
“[a]nyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation of the sentence.
Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may be granted in all cases.” 174 Thus,
the denial of merchants’ rights to seek pardons or commutations of their sentences provides the
basis for another human rights violation by the former regime. Even more, the executions were
also in violation of nearly every provision in Article 14 of the ICCPR – guaranteeing the right to
a fair trial. Most significantly, the merchants were denied “a fair and public hearing by a
competent, independent and impartial tribunal,” 175 “the right to be presumed innocent until
proved guilty according to law,” 176 the right “[t]o be informed promptly and in detail in a
language which he understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him,” 177 the right

http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGASA170032004 [hereinafter Amnesty] [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 53]
173

ICCPR/c.79/Add.1(1992) para. 5. See also Amnesty, supra note 172. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 53] In 1984 the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) adopted the Safeguards
Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty. Among other things, these Safeguards
state that the scope of the death penalty "should not go beyond intentional crimes with lethal or other extremely
grave consequences", and that any legal process resulting in an execution must give "all possible safeguards to
ensure a fair trial, at least equal to those contained in article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.” Id.

174

ICCPR, supra note 23, at art. 6(4). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 7]

175

Id. at art. 14(1).

176

Id. at art. 14(2).

177

Id. at art. 14(3)(a).

42

“to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing,” 178 and “the right
to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law.” 179
Finally, the illegality and overall disdain of summary executions were reaffirmed in 1989,
just 3 years prior to the executions, in the UN Principles on the Effective Prevention and
Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions which stated:
Governments shall prohibit by law all extra-legal, arbitrary and summary
executions and shall ensure that any such executions are recognized as offences
under their criminal laws, and are punishable by appropriate penalties which take
into account the seriousness of such offences. Exceptional circumstances
including a state of war or threat of war, internal political instability or any other
public emergency may not be invoked as a justification of such executions. Such
executions shall not be carried out under any circumstances including, but not
limited to, situations of internal armed conflict, excessive or illegal use of force
by a public official or other person acting in an official capacity or by a person
acting at the instigation, or with the consent or acquiescence of such person, and
situations in which deaths occur in custody. This prohibition shall prevail over
decrees issued by governmental authority. 180
Thus, the extrajudicial executions of the merchants were violations of customary
international law, international human rights norms, the ICCPR, and the UN Principles on the
Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions.
However, an interesting aspect of the Iraqi Special Tribunal is that unlike other similar
tribunals, including the ICTY, ICTR, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, it does not have
jurisdiction over breaches of international humanitarian law outside of genocide, crimes against

178

Id. at art. 14(3)(d).

179

Id. at art. 14(5). See also Article 6 of ECOSOC resolution on Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of
Those Facing the Death Penalty (1996/15): [...] calls upon Member States in which the death penalty may be carried
out to ensure that officials involved in decisions to carry out an execution are fully informed of the status of appeals
and petitions for clemency of the prisoner in question.

180

Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions,
E.S.C. res. 1989/65, annex, 1989 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 52, U.N. Doc. E/1989/89 (1989). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 69]
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humanity, and war crimes. Article 1 of the ICTY Statute states “[t]he International Tribunal
shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 in accordance
with the provisions of the present Statute” 181 Likewise, the Article 1 of the ICTR Statute states
“The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible
for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda
and Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring
States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, in accordance with the provisions of the
present Statute.” 182 Finally, echoed once again, the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone
states “[t]he Special Court shall, except as provided in subparagraph (2), have the power to
prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international
humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30
November 1996, including those leaders who, in committing such crimes, have threatened the
establishment of and implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone.”183 Contrast these
provisions with the equivalent provision from the IST Statute, which states “[t]he Tribunal shall
have jurisdiction over any Iraqi national or resident of Iraq accused of the crimes listed in
Articles 11 to 14 below, committed since July 17, 1968 and up until and including May 1, 2003,
in the territory of the Republic of Iraq or elsewhere, including crimes committed in connection
with Iraq’s wars against the Islamic Republic of Iran and the State of Kuwait.” 184 The IST
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ICTY Statute, supra note 82, art. 1 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 13]

182

ICTR Statute, supra note 83, art. 1. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 12]

183

Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 1(1), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-statute.html.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 15]

184

IST Statute, supra note 1, art. 1(b). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14]
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Statute makes no mention of jurisdiction over violations of humanitarian law not amounting to
war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. Since the IST Statute was based largely on
the aforementioned ICTY and ICTR statutes, the exclusion of jurisdiction of other humanitarian
violations must have been deliberate. The framers of the IST Statute must have intended to limit
the IST jurisdiction to those crimes which are enumerated in the Statute itself.
The ramifications of the expressly excluding other humanitarian violations from the IST
Statute are that the executions cannot be tried by the Tribunal if they do not amount to genocide,
war crimes, or crimes against humanity. This is true even despite the fact that the summary
executions are serious breaches of international law, including a violation of the ICCPR. Thus, if
facts surrounding the execution of the merchants emerge which do not show that an armed
conflict was present, or that the executions were not part of policy or plan, the IST will not have
jurisdiction to hear the case, irregardless of the gravity of the conduct and the clear illegality of
the executions. 185
Still, when attempting to satisfy the objective elements of IST crimes, the denial of the
fundamental rights can be used as evidence to prove that the executions were murders rather than
lawful executions. Extrajudicial punishments are defined by their lack of due process, which, in
certain circumstances (such as in battlefields) is justified. However, when due process and
fundamental rights are illegitimately denied to the executed, the summary executions are
equivalent to murders. Thus, the large-scale violations of the merchants’ human rights, during
the executions, are prima facie evidence of murder.

185

However, it should be noted that the human rights violations mentioned can be prosecuted by Iraqi federal courts
if the Iraqi government chooses to do so.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Of the four types of crimes the IST has jurisdiction over, only two can be said to have
likely occurred – crimes against humanity and abuse of power. Crimes against humanity likely
occurred because the extrajudicial executions, if amounting to murder, were both systematic and
widespread attacks on a civilian population. Only if those responsible for the executions can
show that the killings were legal and not murders, will the executions not amount to crimes
against humanity. Additionally, an abuse of power likely occurred because there was evidence
of manipulation of the judiciary. Charges under Article 14 should be brought against those who
were involved in the manipulations.
Genocide is the crime which least likely occurred during the executions. The targeting of
a protected group is the key element of genocide. Merchants are not a protected group under
either the IST Statute or the Genocide Convention. Thus, genocide likely did not occurred based
on the execution of merchants.
Finally, the executions may have amounted to war crimes under Article 13 of the IST
Statute if the executions were related to an armed conflict. The relationship between the
executions and an armed conflict is a factual inquiry for which the existence of war crimes is
dependant upon. It is up to the prosecution to find a nexus between an armed conflict and the
executions if the former regime is to be charged with war crimes stemming from the executions.
In sum, charges should be brought under Articles 12 (crimes against humanity), 14
(abuse of power), and 15 (criminal liability) of the IST Statute; and possibly also Article 13 (war
crimes) if an armed conflict nexus is established.
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Chart 1 – Number of Victims Sufficient for Crimes against Humanity
Court

Defendant

Crime

Number Directly
Victimized by
Defendant

Total Number of
Victims

Judgment

East
Timor

Benjamin i
Sarmento

Murder and
Deportation

5 killed

12,000 deported by
Sarmento’s group

12 years in prison for
Crimes Against Humanity

Deputy Commander of
the Tim Sasarat Ablai
Militia

East
Timor

Lieutenant-Colonel
Soedjarwo ii

Thousands deported

Failing to prevent the
killing of Timorese

250,00 total victims in
East Timor crisis
Over 1,000

0

Indonesian Military
Chief

East
Timor

Florida

Mateus Lao iii

Armando
Fernandez Larios iv
Chilean Military Officer

ICTR

Eliezer Niyitigeka v
Information Minister of
Rwanda

ICTR

Jean Paul
Akayesu vi
Mayor of Taba

ICTY

Murder

Sakunar militia member

Dario Kordic vii

Direct participation
in an extra-judicial
killing squad (the
“Caravan of Death”)

One complaint, but
several mentioned as
part of the action

Murder,
extermination, rape,
and inhumane acts

Around 10 people were
killed or raped by
Niyitigeka himself.

Did not prevent
murder,
extermination,
inhumane acts,
torture, and rape
Participated in a
murder
Ordering a massacre

Vice-president of the
Bosnian Croat Republic

ICTY

Dragoljub
Kunarac viii

One man was killed by
Lao after trying to
escape from East Timor

Rape, torture, and
enslavement

Judge
Officials

Not preventing
murder
Murder

Officers

Murder

250,00 total victims in
East Timor crisis
70 by Larios’ Caravan of
Death
2,603 under Pinochet
800,00 killed during
entire Rwanda crisis

His most damaging
actions was his
incitement of genocide
via propaganda on
Rwandan radio
One murdered by
Akayesu himself

2,000 killed in Taba while
Akayesu was mayor

11 were killed under
Akayesu’s orders

800,00 killed during
entire Rwanda crisis

Ordered the massacre
of hundreds

Hundreds because of his
orders

At least 16 raped by
Kunarac himself

200,000 killed during
entire Balkan crisis
Dozens raped by Kunarac
and his platoon

Commander in the Serb
Army

IST

250,00 total victims in
East Timor crisis
n/a – an apparently
isolated incident

Could have prevented
63 murders
Murdered between 0
and 63
Murdered between 0
and 63
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200,000 killed during
entire Balkan crisis
Tens of thousands were
executed by the “Special
Courts” in Iraq
300,000 were killed or are
missing under Hussein’s
regime.

5 years in prison for
Crimes Against Humanity

8 years in prison for
Crimes Against Humanity

Found liable for, inter
alia, crimes against
humanity and was
instructed to pay $4
million in damages.
Life in prison for crimes
against humanity and
genocide

Life in prison for crimes
against humanity (also
convicted of genocide)

25 years in prison for,
inter alia, Crimes Against
Humanity

28 years in prison for,
inter alia, Crimes Against
Humanity
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